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Abstract
This paper investigates the importance of ethnic homophily in the hiring discrimination process,
and provides a novel test for statistical discrimination. Our evidence comes from a correspondence
test performed in France, in which we use three different kinds of ethnic identification: French
sounding names, North African sounding names, and “foreign” sounding names with no clear
ethnic association. Within both male and female groups, we show that all non-French applicants
are equally discriminated against when compared to French applicants. This indicates that racial
discrimination in employment is directed against members of non-majority ethnic groups, and
highlights the importance of favoritism for in-group members. Moreover we find direct evidence of
homophily: recruiters with European names are more likely to call back French named applicants
and female recruiters are more likely to call back women. The paper also directly tests for
statistical discrimination by adding a signal related to language skill ability in all resumes sent
to half the job offers. Although the signal inclusion significantly impacts the discrimination
experienced by non-French females, it is much weaker for male minorities.
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Language Skills and Homophilous Hiring Discrimination: Evidence
from Gender- and Racially-Differentiated Applications
Anthony Edo Nicolas Jacquemet Constantine Yannelis
Octobre 2013
Résumé
Cet article s’intéresse au rôle de l’homophilie ethnique dans la discrimination à l’embauche, et
propose une nouvelle façon de tester l’existence d’une discrimination statistique. Notre analyse
porte sur des tests de correspondance effectués en France dans lesquels nous distinguons trois
types d’identification ethnique: des noms à consonance Française, à consonance maghrébine, et à
consonance étrangère sans attache claire à une origine particulière. Nos résultats montrent que
la discrimination à l’embauche opère indifféremment envers tous les noms à consonance étrangère,
tant chez les hommes que chez les femmes. Ce résultat indique que la discrimination ethnique
s’effectue à l’encontre de tous ceux qui n’appartiennent pas à la majorité ethnique, et souligne
l’importance du favoritisme au sein de groupes ethniques. Nous montrons qui plus est l’existence
de l’homophilie : les recruteurs au nom européen ont tendance à rappeler davantage les noms à
consonance française, et les femmes ont tendance à rappeler davantage des femmes. Cet article
teste également l’existence d’une discrimination statistique en ajoutant aux CV un signal portant
sur les compétences linguistiques pour la moitié des offres d’emploi. Si l’inclusion du signal réduit
fortement la discrimination envers les noms féminins à consonance étrangère, cet effet est bien plus
faible pour les noms masculins à consonance étrangère.
Mots-clés: Evaluation par correspondance, Discrimination de genre, Discrimination raciale, Ho-
mophilie ethnique, Compétences linguistiques
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1 Introduction
Homophily, the idea that people apply preferential treatment to similar individuals, has long-standing
roots in both sociology (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954; Hamm, 2000; Mollica, Gray, and Treviño,
2003; Wimmer and Lewis, 2010) and psychology (Vigil and Venner, 2012). While a strong interest
in homophilous behavior has arisen during the last decade in the analysis of network formation
in economics, it is only recently that scholars interested in discriminatory practices have started to
investigate the opposition between one’s own racial group and any other ethnic origin (Stoll, Raphael,
and Holzer, 2004; Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard, 2009).
This paper contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we offer an experimental investigation
of racial homophily, based on correspondence testing, while this previous evidence relies on observa-
tional data. Second, we explicitly test for statistical discrimination and provide evidence regarding
the underlying reason behind homophily in hiring decisions. In the same way that discrimination is
traditionally rationalized as a matter of either preferences (in line with Becker (1971)’s model of taste
based discrimination) or information (as suggested by the statistical discrimination models of Arrow,
1973; Phelps, 1972) individuals can associate with similar individuals because of a preference for ho-
mogeneity, through e.g., conformity motives, or because they tend to share common characteristics
that make communication, mutual trust and relationship formation easier (McPherson, Smith-Lovin,
and Cook, 2001; Putnam, 2007). From an empirical point of view, one testable difference between the
two explanations is that only the second one is sensitive to the available information on applicants.
This kind of test requires focusing on specific dimensions about which a (real or perceived) lack of
information can induce discrimination. We focus on language abilities, a skill raised by employers to
rationalize their own discriminatory behavior (Oreopoulos, 2011).
Our measure of homophily relies on the design of Jacquemet and Yannelis (2012). They measure
homophily driven discrimination in the Chicago labor market by comparing the disadvantage expe-
rienced by clearly identified minorities – African-Americans in their context – to the one faced by
foreign applicants for whom no clear origin is identified by the employer. We replicate the experiment
in France, using North African applicants as a benchmark, and interact race and gender by using
two sets of racially differentiated applications – one male, one female. We control for the potentially
confounding effect of religion (documented, e.g., by Adida, Laitin, and Valfort, 2010) by selecting
foreign names that are not perceived as being Muslim. To test for the effect of enhanced information
about language skills ability, we alter the resumes sent to half the job postings by adding language
related extra activities or grades.
Our results are three-fold. First, we find strong evidence in favor of ethnic homophily in the
French labor market. Foreign applicants, whether their specific minority group is identified or not,
are equally disadvantaged as compared to French applicants across all dimensions under study –
for both genders, and whether or not more information is available in the application. Second, we
find evidence of statistical discrimination for female applications: once a signal related to language
2
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skill abilities is included, racial discrimination is drastically reduced. Third, we find an asymmetric
effect of the signal across genders, as for males enhanced information barely changes the success of
applications. One interpretation is that information has nothing to do with males being discriminated
against; another one, which is more consistent with the pattern observed for women, is that the lack
of information driving racial homophily amongst males applicants is not related to language skills
but to other individual characteristics.
The next section summarizes the existing literature on both hiring discrimination and ethnic
homophily. Section 3 describes our experimental design and its implementation in Paris and its
suburbs. In Section 4, we provide an overview of the outcomes of the experiment based on descriptive
statistics. Section 5 turns to a statistical analysis of the data which is robust to the bias induced
by racial group differences in the distribution of unobservables (Heckman and Siegelman, 1993). We
discuss the possible interpretations of our results in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
2 Discrimination and Racial Homophily
Accumulated evidence from correspondence studies robustly supports two main conclusions: discrimi-
nation against minority applicants, with discrimination ratios generally ranging from 1.3 to 1.7.1 This
is true in many countries with very diverse immigration and colonial histories – USA (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2004), Canada (Oreopoulos, 2011), Australia (Booth, Leigh, and Varganova, 2012),
Sweden (Carlsson and Rooth, 2007), France (Duguet, Leandri, L’Horty, and Petit, 2010); see Riach
and Rich (2002) for a complete survey of existing results. Recent evidence also shows that such results
vary little according to the specific minority used to test for discrimination. In Canada, Oreopoulos
(2011); Dechief and Oreopoulos (2012) show that Asian, Indian and Greeks all fare similarly poorly
compared to native Canadians. Duguet, Du Parquet, L’Horty, and Petit (2012) study the success of
male and female applications of Senegalese, Moroccan and Vietnamese origin in France. Although
they focus on a high-skill occupation (computing with a Masters degree), they obtain discrimination
ratios that roughly fall in the above mentioned range, and which are similar against most non-French
applicants.2 These studies rely on correspondence tests, which have the well-known drawback that
no “real” person is behind experimental applications. The strength of discrimination, and that ap-
plicants from the ethnic majority group are always favored, has however been confirmed by recent
evidence from an audit study based on Latino and Black applications in New-York (Pager, Western,
and Bonikowski, 2009).
Such a stability across countries and across minorities within countries suggests that a more
encompassing mechanism may underlie observed discrimination. The sociological notion of homophily
1Discrimination ratios are defined in the literature as the relative favoritism experienced by non-minority applicants
as compared to minority ones; denoting C the callback rate, with index 1 for minority applicants and 0 for non minority
ones, the discrimination ratio is : C0/C1.
2Vietnamese women stand as one unexplained exception, facing almost no discrimination. The comparison with
other applications is difficult, though, as the resumes include gender specific information for this origin only.
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points to such a mechanism, based on the principle that “birds of a feather flock together”. This
literature (reviewed in McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001) not only shows that homogeneity
is a driving force of social networks formation, but also that ethnicity is certainly the most influential
factor of this process. While homophily is a well recognized phenomenon in the economics literature
on network formation, the application to the effect of race on labor market outcomes only recently
emerged (see Lang and Lehmann, 2012; Charles and Guryan, 2011, for up to date reviews of the
theoretical and empirical literature on hiring discrimination). Based on observational data from
four cities in the U.S., Stoll, Raphael, and Holzer (2004) shows that black employers tend to hire
more black applicants, not only because they receive more black applications but also because they
hire a greater proportion of blacks who apply. Using data from a large U.S. retail firm, the study by
Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard (2009, 2011) finds an own-race bias in manager-employee relationships
in regards to quits, dismissals and promotion.3 Jacquemet and Yannelis (2012) are the first to study
homophily experimentally, based on a correspondence test in Chicago including foreign names with no
clear ethnic identification. They show that the discrimination rates against these applicants are the
same as the one experienced by African-American applicants in all fields under study – accounting,
nursing and programming.
This paper replicates the Jacquemet and Yannelis (2012) measure of homophily based discrim-
ination, with three additions. First, the experiment is implemented in France instead of Chicago,
providing a robustness check of the original results. Second, we interact racial discrimination with
gender discrimination by adding a male equivalent to each female applicant. Third, we consider three
different levels of job occupations (in the same sector) to assess the sensitivity of our results to the
kinds of skills required. Our results generalize Jacquemet and Yannelis (2012) to the French context
as well as to both males and females, and to all occupational categories under study. We take this
as robust evidence that homophily has explanatory power on observed discrimination in hiring. Our
main treatment of interest tries to disentangle the reasons behind this behavior.
Two main reasons have been raised to explain homophilous behavior in social relationships.4
Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009) develop a model of network formation in which homophily results
from an intrinsic individual preference for similar individuals. Applied to racial discrimination, this
mechanism is very similar to the taste-based model introduced by Becker (1971). The laboratory
3Recent evidence shows that the idea that racial homophily explains discriminatory behavior extends beyond labor
market outcomes. For instance, Price and Wolfers (2010); Price, Lefgren, and Tappen (2013) find evidence of a strong
own-race bias in the number of fouls awarded against NBA players.
4These two explanations refer to what sociologist call choice homophily (Kossinets and Watts, 2009). A third
one, formalized for instance by Jackson and Rogers (2007); Bramoullé and Rogers (2009) in the context of network
formation, explains homophilous behavior by a higher probability of meeting an in-group partner – this is called induced
homophily, because homophily results from the structural opportunities to interact. Because all applications are sent
to each employer, correspondence testing is ill-equipped to provide reliable measures of such a phenomenon. It does not
mean it cannot contribute to the observed differences between applicants – it will be the case, for instance, if employers’
decisions are correlated to the relative composition of the overall application pool, and the pool is not exogenous to the
employers’ characteristics. In the empirical part, we will include covariates related to the employer location to provide
some control over this channel.
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experiments evidence reported in Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein (2007) tend to
support a different, belief-based, explanation. The experiments take place in the neighbourhood of
Kampala, the Uganda’s capital, and use as a treatment variable the ethnicity of the partners of the
game by making use of the high level of diversity in terms of tribes in Uganda. The evidence relies on
standard social preferences games and shows that: (i) higher homogeneity inside groups is associated
with much higher voluntary contributions to a public good, while at the same time (ii) there is no
difference in the level of gift chosen in a dictator game. It is only when the tribe of both players is
common knowledge (the receiver knows what tribe the sender belongs to) that people treat others
from their own tribe more favourably. The preferred interpretation of the authors is the existence of a
norm within ethnic groups, according to which cooperation among co-ethnics should be reciprocated.
Such a pattern in social behavior indicates that beliefs and information on who the others are; as well
as compliance to what the others are believed to expect, plays a greater role than preferences.5 Since
information, rather than the shape of preferences, drives discriminatory behavior in this case, this
mechanism echoes the statistical view of racial discrimination introduced by Arrow (1973); Phelps
(1972).
In the context of hiring discrimination experiments, Oreopoulos (2011); Dechief and Oreopoulos
(2012) are the first to systematically manipulate the content of the applications in order to investigate
the extent of statistical discrimination. These experiments use a very rich set of resume characteristics
as treatment variables – language fluency, multinational firm experience, active education from highly
selective schools, extracurricular activities. None of them influences the discrimination observed, in
Canada, against both male and female applicants from Indian, Pakistani, Chinese or Greek origin.
The authors also conducted debriefing interviews with recruiters, from which language skills appear as
a major concern – although mentioning fluency on the resume does not affect any of the discrimination
ratios. This concern is also very likely to be faced by French employers, as many second and third
generation immigrants have distinctive ways of speaking (Trimaille, 2004).6 In particular, they may
have more difficulties in speaking, writting or communicating with their managers and/or consumers.
Building on this evidence, we seek to measure the extent of statistical discrimination associated
with language skills. Although the reasons why employers discriminate cannot be observed directly,
the extent of available information has observational consequences that allow the researcher to dis-
entangle between statistical and taste based discrimination. As employers learn more about the
productivity of workers, they will rely less on noisy signals that are correlated with productivity,
such as race. Altonji and Pierret (2001), for instance, use the arrival of information associated to
increase experience in the same firm to test for statistical discrimination in wage setting.7 We develop
5This result is supported by McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001); Putnam (2007) who suggest that individuals
may cooperate with similar others for ease of communication, mutual trust and closed cultural features that smooth
the coordination of activity.
6This feature is supported by Vallet and Caille (1996) who show that, in 1989, foreign pupils and children of
immigrants overall achieved lower scores than other pupils in a French assessment test.
7Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001); Antonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh (2005); Levitt (2004); Pope and Sydnor
5
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a similar strategy, which compares discrimination in cases where a prospective employer has more
or less information about an individual’s underlying ability. Our treatment variable is an additional
resume experience (detailed below) related to the practice of French language. We treat this addi-
tion as a between job treatment variable, adding it to all applications sent to half the job offers. If
perceived language skills are correlated with both ethnic background and productivity, prospective
employers that statistically discriminate should rely less on ethnic background to screen applicants.
Hence, the signal premium should be higher for minority applicants implying a lower level of racial
discrimination. However, if employers are engaging only in taste based discrimination the signal of
language abilities should have no effect.8
We find a strong effect of the signal on discrimination, but mainly among females, indicating that
statistical discrimination is present in the French labor market. For female applicants that include
a signal for French language ability, the measured level of discrimination towards minority groups
drops substantially. For male applicants – who are systematically disfavored as compared to their
female counterpart – the effect of the signal is much weaker, both statistically and economically.
3 Design of the Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis relies on three main ingredients: the identity of fictitious applicants; the
content of the applications and the job offers to which we apply on this basis.
3.1 Treatment Variable I: Fictitious Applicants
We rely on six fictitious identities. To test for gender discrimination, three of them are male and three
are female. Each of the three correspond to a different origin. Our benchmark is French sounding
names, to which we add two origins: North African sounding names and names perceived as (i)
foreign but with (ii) no clear ethnic origin, so that they are unidentifiable by employers.
(2011) also exploit the arrival of new information to test for statistical discrimination in motor vehicle searches, a game
show and an online peer to peer lending service, respectively.
8Correspondence tests have the attractive feature of being experimental, thus generating reliable causal effects.
They also have well-known drawbacks, to which our study will be no exception. First, the outcome variable is the
callback rate elicited by experimental applications rather than actual job propositions. Correspondence tests may
under or overstate the level of discrimination in hiring since companies generally have multistage recruiting processes,
which eventually require personal interviews. The estimates overstate discrimination only if (i) discrimination occurs
at the job interview stage, and (ii) operates in the opposite direction – e.g., minority applicants are favoured once
they are called back. This configuration is generally seen as highly unlikely. Second, for obvious practical reasons,
the study is restricted to job offers that circulate through public information channels, thus excluding all positions
fulfilled through individual networks. This induces two potential sources of bias: first, it can be that job finding though
network compensates the observed difference in success across applicant types; second, there is a potential selection
effect in the pool of job offers. Existing evidence from this literature – initiated by Granovetter (1973) and surveyed
e.g., in Ioannides and Loury (2004) – is mixed as regards the interaction between ethnic origin and job finding through
individual networks. The composition effect of the job offers pool leads to a local treatment effects – i.e. the study
elicits discrimination for only a sub-part of such a dual labor maket. Again, there are good reasons to think that the
estimate provides a lower bound of actual discrimination based on this selected sample, as empirical evidence tends to
support the existence of ethnic homophily in social networks.
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The choice of the names is grounded on a preliminary survey that asks respondents to indicate
to what origin, if any, they associate the names. We gather further control information by also
asking respondents their guess for a gender and a religion associated to the name.9 The survey
mixes a sample of 32 names with clearly identifiable French and North African names as well as a
set of names intended to be unidentifiable. The sample of names has been created based on public
sources of information and the study by Duguet, Leandri, L’Horty, and Petit (2010). The survey has
been conducted in various area in Paris using 150 employees mainly from the public sector (nurse,
nursery nurse and temps) and 150 college students (i.e. a total of 300 respondents). We use public
employees and college students for several reasons. On one hand, public workers may (i) share similar
perception than employers in determining the origin of names, (ii) without being implicated in any
decision process to recruit applicants. In fact, this population of workers does not belong to human
resource departments. It is therefore unlikely that respondents see the names in the survey at later
stages of the experiment once resumes are sent out. On the other hand, the sample is complemented
with college students since it is a much simpler population to investigate.
The results of the survey for the six names we consequently selected for the study are displayed
in Table 1. The results confirm very high rates of correct guesses in terms of origins and gender for
both French and North African sounding names, suggesting a very high reliability of the treatment
variable. Second, the share of respondents who are unable to associate any particular origin to the
last two names (leaving the field blank or putting a question mark) is always higher than two thirds.
This means both that these names are largely perceived as non-French, and at the same time that
no specific immigrant group is associated to these names. In spite of this high uncertainty about the
names’ origins, each one is associated with one particular gender for a large majority of respondents.
These two names will be used in the study as the male and female treatment variable used to test
ethnic homophily, i.e. discrimination against applicants for the only reason that they do not belong
to the majority ethnic group.
One potential challenge to such an interpretation of this set of names is that their treatment effects
could potentially be driven by strong and consistent beliefs from a minority of employers. Inspection
of the middle column of Table 1 discards such an interpretation. Among the 17% of respondents
answering the origin question about ALDEGI Jatrix, and the 30% answering it for HADAV Alissa,
the guesses are dispersed in terms of both geographic location and religion.10 Interestingly, both
names are associated by a majority of respondents to different religions: Christian for Jatrix, Jewish
for Alissa. These are also different from the perceived religion of the North African names, which are
unsurprisingly identified as Muslims, while French names are widely identified as Christian.11
9The question about religion was not included in the first wave of the survey. We ran a second wave, with again
300 respondents, including only this question. We decided not to ask the origin again to this second sample in order
to avoid that respondents mechanically relate religion to origin.
10The most frequent origins are Eastern Europe (5%) and Southern Europe (3%) for Jatrix Aldegi; and North African
(9%) and Israeli (6%) for Alissa Hadav.
11Among the residual respondents about the religion question, Jatrix is identified as Jewish by 16% of the sample
7
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Table 1: Perceived Origins, Gender and Religion for the Six Identities used in the Study
Names Origin and Sex Guesses Other Perceived Origin Perceived Religion
1. French Correct M F
LECLERC Pascal 99% 97% 1% Unknown 1% - Christian 96%
ROUSSET Sandrine 97% 1% 98% Unknown 2% - Christian 95%
2. North African Correct M F
BENBALIT Rachid 94% 96% 3% Unknown 2% Israeli 2% Muslim 94%
BENOUNIS Samira 92% 1% 99% Israeli 3% Unknown 3% Muslim 77%
3. Foreign Unknown M F
ALDEGI Jatrix 83% 73% 10% East Eur. 5% South Eur. 3% Christian 67%
HADAV Alissa 70% 1% 83% North Afr. 9% Israeli 6% Jewish 55%
Notes: The table reports the perceived origins, gender and religion of names for the six identities used in this study. The first two
variables have been collected on a sample of 300 respondents; the religion question has been asked in the a second wave with 300
other respondents. The first column shows the share of correct guesses for the two first sets of names (French and North African)
and the share of respondents who do not identify the origin of Foreign names. The percentage of respondents who perceived the
name as male or female is indicated in columns M (male) and F (female). In addition to the prevalent guess, the middle columns
display the most frequent answers among residuals respondents. Finally, the right-hand side of the table provides the most likely
perceived religion of those names.
3.2 Treatment Variable II: Content of the Applications
To maximize the job offers collected during the study, we select a dynamic sector which is less
sensitive than others to economic fluctuations hence offering a large quantity of vacancies. We focus
on accounting jobs, in particular vacancies advertising openings for accounting assistant, accounting
secretary and accountants.12
We construct six resumes from actual ones accessible online and alter them to create a distinct
set that would not be associated with their owners. Resumes are further arranged so that they differ
in terms of content and form (layout, style and typeface) to limit the risk of detection. These small
differences between applications could induce uncontrolled systematic differences in the perceived
quality of resumes by the employer. To orthogonalize the differences in the content of the application
and the applicant’s identity, a random rotation system is implemented across names and resumes
and as Muslim by 9% of the sample; Alissa is perceived as either Christian (26%) or Muslim (14%).
12This choice will also ease comparison with Duguet, Leandri, L’Horty, and Petit (2010), who selected the same sector.
We moreover chose jobs with varying shares of women – females amount to 66% of people employed in accounting jobs
and 84% of people in assistant and secretary jobs (source: French labor force survey, 2010 wave).
8
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from one job offer to the other.
To limit the noise in the relative success of applicants introduced by the randomization, we
constrained (resume specific) characteristics of the applicants to be similar according to the following
dimensions. Applicants were born in 1988 (aged 23) and have never repeated a year. They all are
single. In line with the habits of the French labor market, the nationality of the applicant never
appears on the resume – which signals they all are French. The postal addresses are also application
specific (they do not change as the applicant name changes) and have been chosen within the same area
of the South of Paris.13 Applicants have a BTS (Brevet de Technicien Supérieur - BTS) in accounting
and management obtained in 2009.14 The educational background of the six fictitious applicants is
also similar, and consistent with their educational attainment. Applicants are not employed when
they apply to show their immediate availability. Their work experience ranges from 18 to 22 months
composed of two or three different spells, whose job titles and corresponding job descriptions are
real but slightly altered and randomly assigned to the six resumes. Moreover, a motivation letter
is created for each application, whose form is consistent with the associated resume. In order to be
realistic and representative, the motivation letters are also created from multiple examples accessible
online. Last, we account for gender differences between our applicants by adding clear and implicit
indicators of gender through spelling in resumes and/or motivation letters. For instance, we added
gender links such as “assistant” for male and “assistante” for female, as well as some abbreviation like
“M.” and “Mlle”.
All of the above features are common to all applications. The content of the applications is
also used as a treatment variable, through additional skill signals related to language ability. In the
applications sent to half the job postings, we add one of each of the six following sentences on all
resumes sent to the employer:
• Tutorial for pupils with difficulties in lecture and redaction – Work Experience Category ;
• French Tutoring – Work Experience Category ;
• Member of a reading club – Leisure Category ;
• Participation in Scrabble and Crossword competition – Leisure Category ;
• Writer of an inter-college newspaper – Leisure Category ;
• Reward for a well-known competition on French language skills in 2003 (rank: 54/8,500) –
Leisure Category ;
13Although Duguet, Leandri, L’Horty, and Petit (2010) show that location of the applicants strongly interacts with
racial discrimination, our design neutralizes this dimension.
14According to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), this level of education corresponds
to the first stage of tertiary education. This educational attainment is the most requested for accounting jobs.
9
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The signals are neither application- nor identity- specific: we match them to applications and identity
using an additional systematic rotation scheme. All signals are strongly related to language skills –
two of them refer to past experience in French teaching, the others are related to past leisure or extra
activities centered around use of the French language.
3.3 Implementation of the Experiment
The experiment was conducted between September 2011 and February 2012 in Paris and its suburbs.
We responded daily to job advertisements provided by the major employment agency Pôle Emploi .
Other sources of job vacancies, such as APEC.fr and cadreemploi.fr, were also used to complete our
sample. No unsolicited applications were sent. Jobs listings are included in the study according to
the following criteria: full or part-time job, short or long-term contracts (excluding temporary jobs)
and located in the Ile-de-France (Paris and its suburbs). Offers were not included if they required a
Master’s degree, some specific work experience, or more than two years of experience.
We sent six applications (one for each name in Table 1) to each job offer. They are sent sequentially
and in random order, usually between 10 AM and 2 PM on the same day as it appeared on the website.
Resumes are addressed to employers in word format via direct email.15 For each fictitious identity,
an email address and a telephone number (including an automatic answering service) were registered
at large internet providers (i.e. Yahoo, Laposte, Hotmail or Gmail) and at a phone company (SFR).
All of this information is applicant-specific and moves across resumes along with the identity of the
applicant. Our main outcome variable is the number of callbacks elicited by each applicant. In order
to minimize the effect of the study on the labor market, any invitation is promptly declined by email.
Because almost all job advertisements are collected through Pôle Emploi , we gather several ad-
ditional control variables. First, the advertisements are standardized and provide a multitude of
information on the number of employees in the firm, its location, the term of job contract, as well as
the gender and name to whom we send the applications. Second, the agency works almost only with
employers themselves, rather than specialized intermediaries such as interim or recruitment agencies.
This allows us to consider the name provided as the (likely) recruiter’s one, from which we build an
origin and gender variable.
4 Descriptive Statistics
Overall, 504 job vacancy postings complied with the inclusion criteria during the period of the study;
to which we sent 3024 resumes. As a benchmark with existing results, Table 2 provides the overall
success rate of each applicant, by gender (in row) and origin (in column). Three lessons emerge from
two-by-two comparisons.
First, applications with French names always elicit far more callbacks than non-French ones,
with an overall rate of 17% against 10%. The overall discrimination ratio is equal to 1.7. Second,
15In a few cases, applications were sent by postal mail.
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Table 2: Success Rates by Origin/Gender with and without the Inclusion of the Signal
French Names North African Names Foreign Names
Control Signal Overall Control Signal Overall Control Signal Overall
Male 14.3% 15.5% 14.9% 6.0% 8.3% 7.1% 8.3% 7.9% 8.1%
Female 20.6% 18.7% 19.5% 10.7% 14.7% 12.7% 9.1% 15.1% 12.1%
Total 17.5% 17.1% 17.3% 8.3% 11.5% 9.9% 8.7% 11.5% 10.1%
Signal Effect on Racial Discrimination
H1: French6=North African H1: French 6= Foreign H1: North African 6= Foreign
Male 4.17*** 3.48*** 5.40*** 2.73*** 3.91*** 4.63*** -1.61 0.28 -0.96
Female 4.25*** 1.77* 4.29*** 4.85*** 1.57 4.57*** 0.94 -0.23 -0.49
Total 5.35*** 3.70*** 6.46*** 4.96*** 3.58*** 6.09*** -0.36 0.00 -0.24
Gender: t-tests on Mean Callback Differences (H1: Male 6= Female)
-2.63*** -1.30 -2.77*** -2.47*** -2.87*** -3.79*** -0.39*** -3.48*** -2.74***
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. The upper part of the table displays the callback rates elicited
by each applicant, by gender (in row) and race (in column). We provide the overall share of elicited callbacks, as well as its
decomposition according to whether resumes included the signal or not. The total number of applications is 504 for each identity,
and equal to 252 for the sub-samples with and without the signal. The middle part provides the statistics of student t-tests of
equality in mean callbacks between origins. The lower part of the Table provides the statistics of student t-tests of equality in
mean callbacks between gender of the same origin.
a decomposition of callback rates for each non-French origin indicates that North African (9.9%)
and Foreign applicants (10.1%) are equally treated, and both disfavored relative to French ones
(17.3%). The fact that Foreign applicants are discriminated against while their ethnic group is not
identified by employers confirms the prevalence of ethnic homophily among employers - i.e. a general
mistrust against all members of the non-majority ethnic group. These two observations remain true
conditional on the applicant’s gender: the degree of racial discrimination against both Non-French
sets of names is similar inside each gender group. Third, in terms of gender based discrimination,
females are considerably more successful than males in getting through the initial job screening
stage: the gap ranges from 19.6% vs 14.9% among French applications, to 12.7% vs 7.1% for North
African sounding names and 12.1% vs 8.1% for Foreign sounding ones. We also find some evidence
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of intersectionality (the interrelation between several sources of discrimination, see e.g., Crenshaw,
1991) as racial discrimination ratios are more severe amongst males (around 2) than amongst females
(1.6). Such a difference in the strength of discrimination faced by men and women from the same
origin is compatible with either of the two following interpretations: the underlying mechanisms
through which discrimination operates are the same, but they are weaker against women; or the
reasons underlying discrimination against men and women from the same origin are different. The
decomposition of callback rates according to whether a signal is included on the resumes provides
some empirical evidence supporting the second interpretation.
4.1 Differences according to Language Skills Signals
Our main treatment variable of interest is the explicit mention of language skills ability. Table 2 also
provides an overview of the comparison between the control applications (no additional skill related
to language ability on the resume) and the treatment group. Focusing first on the control group, we
observe that all trends discussed based on the overall rate of success are reinforced: both non-French
origins are discriminated against when compared to the French applicant; this is true for both males
and females, while females on average elicit more positive answers than their male counterparts.
The effect of the signal on French applications is negligible: while the inclusion of a signal gen-
erates slightly more callbacks for male applicants, it induces a moderate decrease for female ones
(both are statistically not significant). These two slight variations together are enough to absorb
the statistical significance of the difference between control applications – the t-test statistic of the
difference between French males and females on applications once the signal is included raises to -1.30
(with a corresponding p-value equal to 0.20).
Among non-French applicants, the inclusion of a signal drastically improves the success rates,
with similar magnitude among both non-French origins. The callback rate raises from 8.3% to 11.5%
on average for North African sounding names and from 8.7% to 11.5% for Foreign sounding ones.
However, for each of these two race categories, we notice an important asymmetry between male and
female applicants. The change in callback rates is much stronger on females applications than on
males ones – for whom it is positive for North African applicants, and slightly negative for Foreign
ones. Among females, the raise is both economically and statistically significant:16 thanks to the
inclusion of a signal, the callback rate raises from 10.7% to 14.7% for North African applications,
from 9.1% to 15.1% for foreign ones. Conditional on the signal, the difference with French female
applicants remains marginally significant only for females of North African origin; for foreign ones,
the callback rates are statistically the same.
16The t-test statistic (p-value) of equality in mean callbacks within the group of the non-French female applicants is
equal to -1.86 (0.06).
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4.2 Decomposition according to Job Offer’s Characteristics
Due to the design of the experiment, the randomization of applications applies at the job level on the
basis of the openings during the experiment. The aforementioned discrimination patterns may thus
be subject to composition effects at both the job’s and the employer’s characteristics levels. Beyond
the type of occupation, the characteristics of the job that we observe from the offers are the type of
job contract offered (either long-term or short-term), the number of employees in the firm and its
location. We use the location variable to classify jobs’ location according to the share of immigrants
in the neighbourhood.17 The employer’s characteristics are always hard to measure in correspondence
testing studies, because the experimenter does not observe who is actually in charge of screening and
selecting the applications. We rely on proxies of the employers’ characteristics by using the observed
identity of the person to whom we send the applications. Although it is likely that this name refers
to the person in charge, this can also be the secretary of the human resource department or any other
intermediary inside the organization. Such data are certainly subject to measurement error, so that
the effect of employer’s identity on discrimination has to be interpreted with caution. Based on this
identity, we first construct a measure of the gender of the employer. We also constructed a variable
reflecting the perceived origin of the employer deduced from their names. We divide the origin of
employers into two categories: European and non-European.18
Table 3 disaggregates callbacks according to these characteristics. The first row of the Table
indicates the distribution of the sample according to each dimension. Composition effects are actually
far from being negligible: as the experiment does not randomize these characteristics, the sample is
not balanced in most dimensions – except for the gender of the employer, which reflects the overall
gender composition of the employees of this sector. However, from comparison of callback rates among
applicants conditional on each employer’s characteristics, the patterns describe in the previous sections
does not seem to be sensitive to these decompositions: racial and gender discrimination operate in
the same way across the Table’s columns.
More precisely, non-French applications are disfavored within both groups of male and female
applicants. The degree of racial discrimination is moreover approximately the same across charac-
teristics. Conditional upon ethnic origin, callback rates of female applicants are always higher than
those of males. The intensity of this kind of discrimination does not vary according to either the job
17We use the 2008 wave of the French census (providing exhaustive information on the population living on the
territory) to compute the share of immigrants in the population of each city. This is linked with the location variable
based on the zip code. Ethnic diversity is assumed to be low (high) if the immigrant share is lower (higher) than 20%.
18The gender is deduced from first names and/or abbreviations before the last names like “M.” and “Mme”. The
decomposition of callbacks by employer origin has to be interpreted with caution inasmuch the sample size of non-
European sounding names of employers is low, around 15 % of all job offers. The crucial issues to assess the extent of
the bias induced by the use of these measures are (i) the relative size of the noise captured when our correspondent
is not the actual recruiter; (ii) whether this noise is likely to be correlated with callbacks. On the second issue, one
important factor likely driving force is the size of the firm, as this may jointly affect the likelihood that collecting the
application and making the final decision are separated, and the tendency to discriminate. We do not find such a
pattern once the relationships between employer’s characteristics and callback rates are interacted with firm size.
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contract or the ethnic composition of the job location. The type of job and the employer’s gender, by
contrast, seem to play a role. The gap in callback rates between male and female applications is the
highest in secretary occupations (and at its lowest in accounting jobs). This is in line with the fact
that female workers are overrepresented in secretarial jobs. Although this certainly drives part of the
observed favoritism for women, it should be noted that females remain favored (although to a lesser
extent) on all other types of jobs. Last, female recruiters, as measured by our proxy deduced from
our correspondent’s gender, exhibit a systematically higher callback rate.19 They also appear as al-
most entirely responsible for the discrimination in favor of female applicants among French-sounding
ones. Among male recruiters, both French applications are treated the same way. In order to test
this potential favoritism (i.e. gender homophily among female), we implement two statistical tests of
equality in callback rates between both male and female French applicants according to the gender
of the employer. They confirm our conjecture: while callback rates between French applications are
not significantly different when employers are male, they are different at a 1% level when employers
are female.
5 Results
We now turn to parametric models aimed at measuring the marginal effect of discrimination, condi-
tional on the heterogeneity of employer’s and job’s characteristics. We first sketch a theoretical model
of employer decision making, based on Neumark (2012), showing that simple Probit estimations of
callback rate equations can provide biased measures of discrimination. In a recent methodological
paper, Neumark shows that consistent estimates can be derived from heteroscedastic Probit models,
which account for the confounding effect of varying dispersion of abilities across groups – a limitation
known as the Heckman critique in the literature, in reference to Heckman and Siegelman (1993);
Heckman (1998).. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply this methodology to orig-
inal correspondence test data. We then turn to a formal characterization of our test for statistical
discrimination, based on language skills signals.
5.1 Hiring Discrimination with heteroscedastic Unobserved Heterogeneity
The data generating process of a correspondence study stems from employers treatment of the content
of the applications. We denote P ∗i (J,X,Z) the productivity of an application i in a given position.
This productivity depends on the job’s characteristics (measured mainly through firm specific vari-
ables) J . At the individual level, productivity results from two components: a set of individual
characteristics that are observable to both the econometrician and the employer, Xi; and a compo-
nent which is unobservable to them both, Zi. We assume that race, denoted Ri = 0 for non-minorities
19This result is partly explained by the fact that female recruiters are overrepresented in firms which tend to exhibit
higher callbacks. Female recruiters mainly work in large firms (70%) located in Paris (56%) and offering short-term
contracts (60%).
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(e.g., whites) and Ri = 1 for minorities (e.g., North Africans), do not enter productivity directly.20
This allows focus on discrimination, which in this framework might occur for two reasons. First, let
the employer callback decision be described by the latent variable T ∗i , which determines the treatment
applied to a given application (it will drive a dichotomous choice variable below, but it can be though
of as any continuous outcome, such as e.g., wage offers). Taste-based discrimination implies that such
treatment depends not only on the productivity of the applicant but also on unproductive observable
characteristics such as race:21
T ∗i = T
∗[P ∗i , Ri] = P
∗
i + γRi = δJ + βXi + Zi + γRi .
Second, the invitation decision relies on employer’s perceived productivity of applicant i, to whom
Zi is not observed while Ri is:
E[P ∗i (J,X,Z)|X, J,Ri] = δJ + βXi + E(Z|Ri) ,
which implies statistical discrimination as long as E(Z|Ri) 6= E(Zi) – the unobserved productivity of
an applicant is thought of as being dependent on race. When each employer receives two applications,
one from a nonminority applicant and another from a minority one, discrimination shows up in the
average differential treatment reserved to applications,
E[T ∗|R = 0]− E[T ∗|R = 1] = β[E(X|R = 0)− E(X|R = 1)] + E(Z|R = 0)− E(Z|R = 1) + γ .
By construction, this difference in callback cannot be driven by employer’s characteristic. We thus
omit the term δJ below, implicitly including it in the deterministic part of the model, βX.
5.1.1 The Content of Correspondence Test Data
By way of construction, a correspondence test controls the observables X in such a way that they do
not systematically differ across sub-groups: the difference in observed characteristics must balance
over job applications, hence E(X|R = 0) = E(X|R = 1).22 The difference in treatment over all
20To ease exposition, we focus on the two races case with R = 1 for minority applicants, although the framework
easily generalizes to more ethnic origins or to other specifications of the characteristics describing discriminated sub-
populations, such as gender. It is also worth mentioning that we gather all sources of unobserved heterogeneity in Z.
One can add an i.i.d. error term to the functionals without changing the main conclusions.
21In the following, we will impose the linearity assumptions that will be used to estimate the model. Note that
Z is not only unobserved to the econometrician but also to the employer in a correspondence test (as opposed, e.g.
to an audit study, where employers might gather additional information by meeting experimental applicants). As a
result, employer’s decisions should be deterministic conditional on the observables. To ease exposition and save on
notation, we assume that employers take their callback decisions based on a random draw in the relevant distribution of
unobservables – which generates random variations in decisions across firms. As discussed in (Neumark, 2012, p.1135),
an alternative way to arrive at a statistical model would be to assume random productivity differences across firms
that are multiplicative in the observed productivity of a worker.
22This is the case for two reasons. First, the resumes are calibrated in such a way that all observed productive
characteristics are equally likely. There still remains differences from one resume to another, but systematic differences
across race are ruled out through randomization of the names-resumes matching.
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job applications thus arises due to two parameters: taste based discrimination, γ, and statistical
discrimination which induces a gap in the (perceived or actual) means of the unobserved productive
characteristics E(Z|R = 0) − E(Z|R = 1). Note that the two parameters can only be identified
together unless the study provides enough control to guarantee that the distribution means are exactly
equal, so that only taste based discrimination occurs.23 However, all components of this aggregate
effect arise as the result of an unequal treatment based on unproductive observable characteristics.
As such, they correspond to both the legal and the economic definition of discriminatory behavior:
in the remaining, we thus focus on the identification of the gross handicap experienced by minority
applicants, µ – standing for the sum of these two parameters: µ = E(Z|R = 0)− E(Z|R = 1) + γ.
As noted by Heckman and Siegelman (1993); Heckman (1998) the observational context of a
correspondence study may lead to biased estimates if the variance of the error term is race-specific.24
This is the case because the observed outcome is non-linearly related to the underlying discriminatory
decisions. To see this explicitly, denote c the perceived quality threshold an applicant has to reach
to be invited for an interview: the outcome variable of the experiment is T = 1[T ∗ > c]. Further
assume that the unobserved productivity Z is i.i.d normally distributed in each race sub-group,
but with a (perceived or actual) variance that varies across groups. To ease exposition, we denote
σ20 = V ar(Z|R = 0) and σ21 = V ar(Z|R = 1). The statistical model generating the observed outcome
thus gives the following specifications for the probability of obtaining a callback:
P[T = 1|R = 1, X] = 1− Φ[(c− E(Z|R = 1)− βX + γ)/σ1] = Φ[(βX + E(Z|R = 1) + γ − c)/σ1]
P[T = 1|R = 0, X] = 1− Φ[(c− E(Z|R = 0)− βX)/σ0] = Φ[(βX + E(Z|R = 0)− c)/σ0] ,
where Φ denotes the standard normal distribution. The difference between these two expressions
is the empirical source of identification for discrimination. However, even in the extreme case with
neither statistical nor taste-based discrimination – i.e., γ = 0 and E(Z|R) = E(Z), so that µ = 0 –
the difference in probabilities still depends on the comparison between σ1 and σ0. For instance, if the
X have been chosen at the lower tail of the skills distribution, so that βX < c, and σ0 < σ1 then it
has to be that Φ[(βX−c)/σ1] < Φ[(βX−c)/σ0], ∀X: the experiment produces (spurious) evidence of
discrimination against people from R = 1 origin. In the more general case with both discrimination
and differences in the variance of unobservables, this framework highlights the identification problem
faced by correspondence test data.
23This condition is more likely to be met as the set of observable characteristics is wider. Still, the relative share of
taste-based and statistical discrimination in the aggregate effect of race remains a matter of interpretation and cannot
be empirically tested even in this kind of framework.
24The general principle that heteroscedasticity causes the coefficient estimates in discrete choice models to be incon-
sistent draws back to Yatchew and Griliches (1985).
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5.1.2 Unbiased Measures of Discrimination
The identification problem arises because the average treatment effect ∆ = T |R=0 − T |R=1 provides
an estimate of E(Z|R=0)−cσ0 −
E(Z|R=1)+γ−c
σ1
(up to the functional form of the distribution), while
what one seeks to measure is µ = E(Z|R = 0) − E(Z|R = 1) + γ: the systematic disadvantage
experienced by minority applicants due to their belonging to an observable sub-population. As a
result, the confounding effect of the dispersion in the observables shows up in the comparison of
callback probabilities, thus affecting the mean comparisons between outcomes from the study.
As noted by Neumark (2012), one can however use restrictions on β to restore identification. If
the study provides enough variation on relevant applications characteristics, grouped in X in the
model above, one can estimate β/σ0 and β/σ1 from the (heteroscedastic) Probit model derived in the
previous section. Under the assumption that the effect of X on the callback is homogeneous across
race (i.e. the true value of β is the same), the ratio of the two point estimations identifies σ0/σ1,
which in turn allows us to estimate µ after the usual normalization setting one of the variance terms
equal to 1. Since only one such identifying regressor is needed to achieve identification, any additional
productivity control provides the usual specification tests of an over-identified model.25
5.1.3 Statistical and Taste Based Discrimination
Any empirical test of statistical discrimination is conditional on the choice of (at least) one dimension
of unobserved heterogeneity in productivity. Let η be such a dimension, standing for a measure of
French language ability in our experiment, and S be the treatment variable affecting the content
of the applications: Si = 0 for baseline applications with no additional signal, S = 1 for treated
applications with an explicit mention of language skills ability.
In baseline applications, η is part of the unobserved heterogeneity affecting the success of appli-
cations: Z = z + η, so that:
P[T = 1|R = 1, S = 0, X] = Φ[(βX + E(z + η|R = 1) + γ − c)/σ1]
P[T = 1|R = 0, S = 0, X] = Φ[(βX + E(z + η|R = 0)− c)/σ0] ,
This productivity characteristic is moreover a source of statistical discrimination if E(η|R) 6= E(η),
generating observations of unequal treatment for baseline applications that mix tasted-based discrim-
ination and all sources of statistical discrimination, including language skills. Otherwise, it leaves
discrimination unchanged as E(z + η|R) = E(z|R) + E(η). In treated applications, by contrast, the
resume provides observable information about language skills in such a way that η enters the observed
25When there is more than one race category, one needs as many identification restrictions as the number of variance
parameters.
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productivity term rather than unobserved heterogeneity: 26
P[T = 1|R = 1, S = 1, X] = Φ[(βX + αη + E(z|R = 1) + γ − c)/σ1]
P[T = 1|R = 0, S = 1, X] = Φ[(βX + αη + E(z|R = 0)− c)/σ0] ,
Since the signal is added to all applications sent to a given employer under S = 1, the treatment
effect measured on treated applications includes only taste based discrimination and the remaining
sources of statistical discrimination included in z, beyond the ones measured by η. The difference in
difference estimate between control and treated applications thus identifies the extent of statistical
discrimination related to language skill ability:
E(∆DD) = E[(T |R=0,S=1 − T |R=1,S=1)− (T |R=0,S=0 − T |R=1,S=0)] = −[E(η|R = 0)− E(η|R = 1)]
The variation in discrimination between the two groups of applications thus provides an empirical
measure of the unequal treatment driven by different believes as regards language skills ability.
5.2 Empirical Results
The econometric model requires identifying variables to recover estimates of discrimination that
are not biased by the difference in the variances of unobservables. These variables must affect the
probability of hiring, regardless of race. We exploit three identifying variables. We follow Neumark
(2012) and use academic honors27 received by applicants. We also use the type of jobs (assistant,
secretary or account) and the type of job contract (short or long-term) as they tend to affect hiring
(see Table 3) and their effects do not vary with race.28
We first apply the model to the estimation of the effect of ethnic background, pooling the data
from both gender. Table 4 presents the estimation results from three specifications of the model,
which gradually adds in the control variables (used as identifying variables in the heteroscedastic
Probit estimation) to assess the sensitivity of our results to this choice. As a benchmark, the top
panel presents estimates derived from the homoscedastic Probit model, whereas the bottom panel
presents results from a heteroscedastic Probit model.29 In each model, the effect of ethnic background
is captured by two dummies. The first row presents the coefficient on a dummy variable which is equal
26For simplicity, we assume that the signal provides perfect information about the unobserved skills to the employer.
The framework could be easily generalized to an imperfect signal.
27At the end of high-school, students have to take a national exam called “baccalauréat”. According to the test scores,
students can have academic honors (no honors, relatively good, good and very good honors).
28To examine whether the effect of the identifying variables vary with race, we include in the Probit models in-
teractions between these variables with the non-French origin. In all cases, the Wald tests for joint significance of
interactions indicate that our identifying variables are not correlated with race.
29Heteroscedastic Probit models can be difficult to maximize as identification is fragile (Keele and Park, 2006).
To ensure our estimates are obtained at a global maximum, we complement the simple estimation with a screening
procedure on the value of the likelihood function. We embed the Probit estimation inside a loop on the value of σ0/σ1,
changed from 0.2 to 2.5 through increments of 0.1. This procedure confirms that our estimation reaches a global
maximum within this range.
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Table 4: Conditional Estimates of Homophily
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Control Signal Overall Control Signal Overall Control Signal Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Basic Probit Model
North Afr. -0.084*** -0.053*** -0.069*** -0.084*** -0.053*** -0.069*** -0.084*** -0.053*** -0.069***
(-5.46) (-3.73) (-6.58) (-5.45) (-3.74) (-6.58) (-5.48) (-3.74) (-6.59)
Foreign -0.078*** -0.054*** -0.067*** -0.078*** -0.054*** -0.067*** -0.078*** -0.054*** -0.067***
(-4.95) (-3.66) (-6.14) (-4.95) (-3.66) (-6.13) (-4.99) (-3.65) (-6.15)
Male -0.038*** -0.057*** -0.048*** -0.038*** -0.057*** -0.048*** -0.038*** -0.057*** -0.048***
(-2.59) (-3.52) (-4.35) (-2.61) (-3.51) (-4.36) (-2.60) (-3.50) (-4.34)
Log-lik. -518.4 -519.0 -1111.8 -518.0 -577.7 -1110.0 -516.8 -577.7 -1109.2
B. heteroscedastic Probit Model
North Afr. -0.093** -0.056*** -0.080*** -0.093** -0.054*** -0.082*** -0.094*** -0.054*** -0.083***
(-2.52) (-2.81) (-4.53) (-2.39) (-2.77) (-4.70) (-2.90) (-3.43) (-4.56)
Foreign -0.099*** -0.069*** -0.074*** -0.098*** -0.066*** -0.074*** -0.097*** -0.066*** -0.076***
(-4.63) (-3.38) (-4.32) (-4.49) (-3.44) (-4.47) (-4.81) (-3.43) (-4.40)
Male -0.030* -0.056*** -0.047*** -0.030 -0.057*** -0.047*** -0.032** -0.057*** -0.046***
(-1.66) (-3.30) (-3.80) (-1.61) (-3.43) (-3.85) (-2.08) (-3.43) (-3.77)
Log-lik. -577.2 -578.1 -1111.3 -516.6 -576.7 -1109.3 -515.5 -576.7 -1108.4
Identifying Type of Job Type of Job, Job Contract Type of Job, Job Contract,
Variables Honors
N 1,512 1,512 3,024 1,512 1,512 3,024 1,512 1,512 3,024
Notes. ***, **, * denote statistical significance from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance level. The dependent variable in each
specification is an indicator of whether or not an application received a callback from an employer. T-statistics are indicated in
parentheses below the point estimate. The table reports the marginal effects of race and gender on the likelihood of eliciting a
callback from both homoscedastic and heteroscedastic Probit models. Panel A presents the homoscedastic Probit model while
Panel B presents the heteroscedastic Probit model. Identifying variables included are noted in the bottom panel. For each
regression, we provide the value of the log-likelihood. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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to one if an individual has a North African name. The second row presents the coefficient on a dummy
variable which is equal to one if an individual has a foreign-sounding name that is unidentifiable to
French employers. The results are split between applications which include a signal of ability in the
French language, and those which do not. Overall, the sign and magnitudes of our results are robust
to the inclusion of different sets of identifying variables. The marginal effects from the heteroscedastic
specification are always very close to those from the Probit estimates, indicating that differences in
the distribution of the unobservables across the French and the non-French applicants do not play
a major role in our experiment. The marginal effects are also less significant, as expected given the
higher flexibility of the model.
Reassuringly, both models reaffirm the experimental results found in the descriptive statistics.
Applicants with both North African and unidentifiable Foreign names face a significantly reduced
probability of receiving a callback in comparison to applicants with French names. Moreover, the
coefficient on having a North African name is not significantly different from the coefficient on a
Foreign name, suggesting that all individuals with non-French names face discrimination in the French
labor market.30 This result indicates that discrimination is directed against all non-majority ethnic
groups, and highlights the importance of homophily in hiring discrimination.
Moreover, Table 4 provides evidence of statistical discrimination. In the full sample, the effect of a
non-French name on callbacks pools the effects of statistical and taste based discrimination. Statistical
discrimination arrives from a (real or perceived) gap in the mean or variance of characteristics of
ethnic groups, as employers use ethnicity as a proxy for unobservable characteristics. The extent of
this phenomenon is measured by contrasting the estimates from columns 1, 4, and 7 – that restrict
the sample to resumes that did not include a signal of proficiency in the French language – while
columns 2, 5 and 8 – that restrict the sample to resumes that include a signal of strong abilities in the
French language. Both the ordinary Probit and the heteroscedastic Probit models indicate that the
inclusion of the language signal reduces discrimination faced by applicants with non-French names,
indicating the employers do engage in statistical discrimination.31
We now turn to conditional estimation of gender-specific discrimination, pooling the two non-
French origins as a treatment dummy variable. Table 5 disaggregates the estimates of the effect of
having an ethnic name on the probability of hiring for male, female and all applications. We also
disaggregate the sample according to whether the signal was included or not into resumes – the
homoscedastic Probit model appears in the top panel; the heteroscedastic Probit, identified thanks
to the three above mentioned variables, appear in the bottom panel. The sign and significance of the
30The tests of equality in mean callbacks between the North African and Foreign applicants always indicate that they
are equally discriminated against. For instance, the t-statistic derived from the test of equal treatment between the
Non-French applicants (column 9) are equal to 0.26 and 0.59 for the homoscedastic and heteroscedastic Probit model,
respectively.
31However, the effect of the signal on callbacks for the non-French applicants is not significant with a t-test statistic
(p-value) equal to -1.50 (0.13). As explained below, the effect of the signal on callbacks is mainly driven by the
sub-sample of female identities.
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Table 5: Conditional Estimates of Statistical Discrimination, by Gender
Male Applicants Female Applicants All Applicants
Control Signal Overall Control Signal Overall Control Signal Overall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Basic Probit Model
Non-French -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.098*** -0.037* -0.069*** -0.082*** -0.054*** -0.068***
(-3.95) (-4.21) (-5.76) (-5.21) (-1.86) (-5.04) (-5.76) (-4.16) (-7.07)
Male - - - - - - -0.038*** -0.057*** -0.048***
(-2.59) (-3.50) (-4.34)
Log-lik. -230.4 -243.8 -480.9 -283.8 -330.7 -625.2 -516.9 -577.7 -1109.2
B. heteroscedastic Probit Model
Non-French -0.071*** -0.074*** -0.071*** -0.106*** -0.036 -0.073*** -0.085*** -0.056*** -0.073***
(-3.69) (-3.64) (-4.75) (-4.12) (-1.20) (-4.56) (-4.19) (-3.43) (-6.54)
Male - - - - - - -0.038*** -0.058*** -0.049***
(-2.56) (-3.63) (-4.35)
Log-lik. -230.4 -243.7 -480.9 -283.7 -330.6 -625.1 -516.8 -576.9 -1108.8
N 756 756 1,512 756 756 1,512 1,512 1,512 3,024
Notes. ***, **, * denote statistical significance from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance level. T-statistics are indicated in
parentheses below the point estimate. The dependent variable in each specification is an indicator of whether or not an application
received a callback from an employer. The table reports the marginal effects of race and gender on the likelihood of eliciting a
callback from both homoscedastic and heteroscedastic Probit models. Panel A presents the homoscedastic Probit model while
Panel B presents the heteroscedastic Probit model. All specifications include type of job, type of job contract and academic
honors. For each regression, we provide the value of the log-likelihood. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
coefficients of interest are consistent with the descriptive statistics and the results of Table 4. The
results indicate evidence of a strong discrimination against minorities.
As well as differential levels of discrimination by gender, we also find differential reactions to
the language signal by gender. Including the language signal drastically reduces discrimination for
women. For men, there is some evidence of a reduction in discrimination however the results are
more ambiguous – both the ordinary probit models and the heteroscedastic probit models indicate
that the language signal has a much larger effect for female applicants than for male applicants. For
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women, Table 5 indicates that when the language signal is included the marginal effect of non-French
names reduces by 0.061 points. The difference between the two estimates is significant at the 1%
level. However for men the inclusion of a language signal does not result in any significant change in
the observed level of discrimination.
5.3 Heterogeneity
Table 6 assesses the robustness of our results to composition effects in the pool of job offers. Results are
broken down according to two measures of neighbourhood diversity – the diversity of the geographic
location of the employer, and the urban area – as well as the gender and ethnic origin of the employer.32
Focusing first on diversity, Columns 1 and 2 break down the results by the percentage of foreign-
born individuals in the locale. The sample is restricted to locales where more than 20% of the
population is foreign-born in Column 1, while Column 2 restricts the sample to locales where less
than 20% of the population is foreign-born. This split does not give rise to any noticeable difference:
significant evidence of discrimination against applicants with non-French names is found in both
areas, with similar magnitude. This either suggests that discrimination does not vary with the share
of immigrants around the job offer location, or that the share of immigrants is not a good proxy
to capture the level of diversity in cities. To further investigate this dimension, Columns 3 and 4
present the results broken down by whether or not the employer is located in the city of Paris or
the surrounding suburbs – as it is a well-known phenomenon that in Paris ethnic minorities tend to
live outside the city proper in the banlieue, or suburbs. The results indicate that applicants with
non-French names are discriminated against significantly in both the city of Paris and the suburbs,
however the coefficient on non-French names indicates a greater disadvantage faced by non-French
applicants in the city of Paris as opposed to the suburbs. This results is consistent with the findings
of Jacquemet and Yannelis (2012), who find that in Chicago, where ethnic minorities tend to live in
the city center, firms in the suburbs discriminate much more against African-American applicants
than firms in the suburbs. In both cases, discrimination is greater in areas where a greater portion
of the population hails from the majority group. In both Chicago and Paris, employers thus favor
individuals from their own ethnic group according to location specific data, which is consistent with
homophily.
The right-hand side of Table 6 also provides direct evidence of both ethnic and gender based
homophily. Columns 5 and 6 present results broken down by the ethnic origin of the recruiter
– whether or not the recruiter has a European or non-European name. We only find significant
discrimination against non-French applicants occurring for the set of recruiters with European names.
While applicants with non-French names are also less likely to receive callbacks when the recruiter
has a non-European name, the point estimate is much smaller than in the case of European recruiters
32We also performed separate estimations according to firm size and whether or not the contract is permanent or
temporary. In both cases, the discrimination results are nearly identical across specifications.
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Table 6: Conditional Estimates of Heterogeneity of Discrimination
Firm Location Recruiter Identity
Diverse Homogenous Paris Suburb European Non-Eur. Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Basic Probit Model
Non-French -0.066*** -0.073*** -0.084*** -0.059*** -0.079*** -0.031 -0.057*** -0.095***
(-6.12) (-3.62) (-4.75) (-5.19) (-6.97) (-1.85) (-3.27) (-5.75)
Male -0.045*** -0.060** -0.039** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.031*** -0.021 -0.109***
(-3.75) (-2.18) (-2.02) (-4.06) (-4.13) (-1.45) (-0.58) (-2.83)
Log-likelihood -820.7 -274.6 -423.4 -640.3 -826.9 -270.8 -336.7 -607.7
B. heteroscedastic Probit Model
Non-French -0.076*** -0.066*** -0.093*** -0.066*** -0.087*** -0.034 -0.062*** -0.095***
(-3.39) (-3.75) (-4.28) (-4.81) (-6.48) (-1.02) (-3.51) (-5.58)
Male -0.054*** -0.042** -0.041** -0.055*** -0.539*** -0.032 -0.032 -0.108***
(-3.55) (-2.11) (-2.06) (-3.97) (-4.04) (-1.51) (-0.43) (-2.70)
Log-likelihood -820.6 -274.6 -423.1 -639.9 -826.5 -270.8 -147.0 -256.1
N 912 2,112 1,932 1,092 2,286 738 1,205 1,459
Notes. ***, **, * denote statistical significance from zero at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance level. T-statistics are indicated in
parentheses below the point estimate. The dependent variable in each specification is an indicator of whether or not an application
received a callback from an employer. The criteria by which each specification is restricted is given in the first row of the table.
The table reports the marginal effects of race and gender on the likelihood of eliciting a callback from both homoscedastic and
heteroscedastic Probit models. Panel A presents the homoscedastic Probit model while Panel B presents the heteroscedastic
Probit model. All specifications include type of job, type of job contract and academic honors. Columns (7) and (8) include
dummy variables for the origin of a recruiter and an interaction between the origin of the recruiter and the gender of the applicant.
For each regression, we provide the value of the log-likelihood. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
and moreover is insignificant. We interpret this as direct evidence of homophilous discrimination –
the results are driven by recruiters being more likely to call back applicants of a similar ethnic origin.
Furthermore, Columns 7 and 8 also suggest that homophilous discrimination operates on the basis of
gender as well as race. Once the sample is split according to the gender of the recruiter, we find that
female recruiters are significantly less likely to call back French males, indicating that female recruiters
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prefer French female applicants.33 This result is strongly driven by French female recruiters calling
back more female applicants with French names. In particular, results from additional regressions
show that once the sample is further split according to the origin of the applicant, this gender
homophily does not operate between French recruiters and non-French applicants: non-French males
are always significantly discriminated against whatever the recruiter’s gender and the results are
driven by. This confirms descriptive statistics evidence that ethnic homophily tends to overcome
gender homophily.
6 Discussion
The correspondence test provides robust evidence of homophilic discrimination behavior, which is
preserved both across gender and across various contents of the experimental applications – in all
instances, the relative success of North African and Foreign sounding applicants is similar. In partic-
ular, the observed discrimination against applicants with non-French names remains significant when
the results are broken down by geographic location and the characteristics of the recruiter. These
results also provide more direct evidence of homophilous hiring discrimination– we observe that re-
cruiters are more likely to call back similar individuals. Furthermore, employers in the city of Paris
tend to discriminate against applicants with non-French names more than employers in the suburbs,
which is consistent with homophily as in the Paris metro area minorities tend to live in the suburbs.
In terms of gender discrimination, consistent with previous studies such as Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (2004); Oreopoulos (2011), we also observe that men receive fewer callbacks than women.
This effect is much more pronounced amongst minority applicants. For applicants with French names,
women receive 30% more callbacks than men, while for applicants with unidentified foreign names
women receive 50% more callbacks. The gender gap is largest for applicants with North African
names, with women with North African names receiving 80% more callbacks than men with North
African names. While it is possible that employers generally favor female applicants, this result may
be due to the fact that we chose jobs with larger shares of women – females amount to 66% of people
employed in accounting jobs and 84% of people in assistant and secretary jobs. Booth and Leigh
(2010) find that employers in female dominated occupations tend to favor female applicants.
Our third result sheds new light on statistical discrimination, as we find that the inclusion of the
language signal has an economically significant effect on ethnic discrimination against women. The
effect is also asymmetric across gender, as the effect of the signal is much greater effect for female
applicants than male applicants. This result is consistent with the findings of Arai, Bursell, and
Nekby (2011) in Sweden using Arabic names. When applicants with Arabic names have resumes
enhanced with better work experiences, the gap in callbacks drops for women but not for men.
Laboratory experiments have also found that gender plays a role in the nature of discrimination.
33We note that all estimates include job type dummies, so the result is not driven by sectoral differences. This result
is also robust to the inclusion of firm size dummies as additional controls.
25
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.58
Antonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh (2005) find that discriminatory behavior varies depending on
the age and gender of participants. Moreover the effects of gender discrimination disappear when
the stakes of the game are very large. The result also echoes with prior studies which have found
differential effects of informational signals for men and women. Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2006)
find that employers who use criminal background checks are more likely to hire African-Americans,
and that this effect is much stronger for men than for women. The authors interpret this result as
being consistent with statistical discrimination, and employer being concern with potential criminality
affecting productivity for men more than for women.
The literature thus suggests a number of possible explanations for the differential effect of the
language signal for men and women. First, employer discrimination towards men may be primarily
taste based, while women may suffer statistical discrimination. On the other hand, employers may
be discriminating on characteristics other than language for men – for instance, computing skills or
heterogeneity related to social behavior in working groups. In this sense, the informational distance
(Lundberg and Startz (2004)) between the majority group and minorities may differ for male and
female minorities. Alternatively, the informational content of the language skill signal can go beyond
language abilities per se. For instance, employers may view language ability as a signal of assimilation.
If, at the same time, employers are concerned with women becoming pregnant – since immigrant
women in France have higher birth rates (Westhoff and Frejka, 2007) – then the signal could be
interpreted in terms of a lower “risk” of fertility. Last, the signal, while interpreted the same way
in terms of unobservable productivity, might be seen as more credible for women if, for instance,
the activities added to the resumes are perceived as more feminine. In all instances, the variation
in discrimination induced by the signal is related to the extent of information available about the
applicant, hence identifying a statistical reasoning behind unequal treatment. More research is needed
to determine which of these hypothesis is true and whether other kinds of signals may have larger
effects for men.
7 Conclusion
This study makes two contributions. First, for both gender groups, our experimental results indicate
that non-French applications are equally treated, while they are significantly disfavored relative to
the French ones. At the initial job-screening stage, racial discrimination thus operates against all
non-majority members. Moreover this discrimination is driven by recruiters calling back applicants
from similar ethnic backgrounds. This highlights the important role played by ethnic homophily in
shaping hiring discrimination. The results thus indicate that hiring discrimination may be faced by
a large number of minority groups in a society, rather than being limited to some specific targeted
groups.
Second, the study is also devoted to understanding the underlying mechanisms behind homophily.
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We test for and identify statistical discrimination due to language skill ability by including a signal in
half the applications. The inclusion of a signal drastically undermines racial discrimination within the
group of females, but it has a more ambiguous effect on the discrimination against male minorities.
The overall effect confirms the role played by statistical discrimination, although such an asymmetric
impact also indicates that the causes of discrimination are different across gender.
The fact that language skills are identified as an important source of variation in callbacks is not
only interesting from a theoretical perspective in identifying statistical discrimination, but can also
have policy implications. The fact that employers are using language skills to statistically discrimi-
nate amongst candidates, should turn attention to the implementation of learning and certification
programs designed to improve language abilities. Such programs should be devoted to provide and
certify sufficient language abilities for all applicants. A label could therefore be transcribed in resumes
so as to modify employer beliefs or perception on applicant language skills.
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